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I. Introduction
In the late 1960's and early 1970's regulation of raptors'
in North America underwent an intensive regulatory and leg-
islative metamorphosis. In five short years, birds of prey, his-
torically identified en famile as vermin, became the most reg-
ulated wildlife on the continent. The flagship federal statutes
were the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)2 and Migra-
1. A raptor is a bird of prey. In regulatory parlance, raptor means a live migra-
tory bird of the Order Falconiformes or the Order Strigiformes, other than a bald
eagle (Haliaceetus leucocephalus) or a golden eagle (Aquila chrysaetos). 50 C.F.R. §
21.3 (1985). Raptors include falcons, hawks, eagles and the one owl (Great Horned
owl - Bubo virginianus) useful in the sport of falconry.
2. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
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tory Bird Treaty Act Amendment of 1972 (MBTA).3 This leg-
islation effectively prohibited the sale of all native raptors in
the United States. Access to the birds was restricted to a few
qualified individuals and institutions. For the most part, the
individuals were falconers who legally possessed birds prior to
the Acts. At the time the Acts were passed, these men and
women were beginning to breed raptors in captivity for the
first time in history. Breeding projects were directed toward
supplementing the declining wild stock of peregrine falcons.
Both Acts proscribed the sale of listed species. As a re-
sult, raptor propagators, who had single-handedly developed
specialized breeding techniques designed to save wild species
of endangered raptors, found themselves unable to defray
their substantial expenses by accepting consideration for the
birds they produced. In 1978, recognizing their successful ef-
forts, Congress amended the Endangered Species Act to ex-
empt pre-act birds and their progeny from the prohibitions of
the Act in order to facilitate transfers of captive-bred pere-
grine falcons (the only endangered or threatened species of in-
terest to falconers) among falconers or propagators."
The Secretary of the Interior promulgated regulations
permitting the sale of captive-bred raptors among licensed fal-
coners and propagators.5 Twenty-one states have adopted the
full federal regulations allowing the sale of captive-bred rap-
tors to qualified individuals;' twenty-three states have an-
nounced their intention to do so but have not promulgated
the regulations. Two states, New York and California, will
3. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-715s (1982).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
1532-36, 1538-40, & 1542 (1982)).
5. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.32, 17.41, 21.28 (1985).
6. Twenty-one states have adopted the propagation regulations approved by the
Fish & Wildlife Service: Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Missouri, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, Virginia, and Wyo-
ming. As of April 1987, Nebraska and North Dakota have not implemented them.
North Am. Raptor Breeders' Ass'n, Inc., 1986 President's Reports 1 (1987).
Forty-two states have adopted the federal falconry regulations. See 50 C.F.R. §
21.29(k) (1985).
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continue to prohibit the sale of all raptors.7 At least two other
states have regulations permitting the sale of captive-bred
raptors but with special provisions that are more restrictive
than the federal regulations.'
This article will examine the questions surrounding the
private ownership of captive-bred raptors and the legality of
state statutes which restrict the sale of captive-bred raptors
beyond what is federally authorized. For example, who really
owns a captive-bred bird? Can state prohibitions or restric-
tions on their sale in the name of conservation stand in the
path of federal statutory and regulatory schemes which seek
to encourage commerce in these animals in the name of
conservation?
II. History of Modern North American Falconry and
Raptor Propagation
A. Falconry
Falconry9 is the most ancient field sport. Although the
sport was practiced by the Aztec ruler Montezuma in the six-
teenth century,10 North American falconers trace their sports'
heritage to a three thousand year tradition with its roots in
Japan, the Mideast and the barbaric tribes of central Asia,
and its stem in Medieval and Renaissance Europe. Modern
7. New York is currently the only state that prohibits the sale of raptors by stat-
ute. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-1009 (McKinney 1987). In practice, the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) does not regulate the sale of ex-
otic raptors for falconry. California regulations purport to prohibit the sale of all rap-
tors for falconry purposes, including exotic species. ("Exotic" is a term of art meaning
non-indigenous to North America). Cal. Fish & Game Code § 395 (West 1984 & Supp.
1987); Cal. Admin. Code tit. 14, § 670 (1986).
8. Regulations in Wyoming restrict the sale of such birds beyond what is re-
quired under federal regulations. Under Wyoming regulations, only the propagator
can sell a bird. Propagators can only sell birds that they have produced and each bird
can only be sold once in its lifetime. No propagator can sell any bird prior to his or
her third year of operation. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, ch. 25.1, Raptor Propagation
Regulations § 5 (1987).
9. Falconry is the sport of taking quarry with trained raptors. 50 C.F.R. § 21.3
(1985).
10. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Environmental Assessment:
Proposed Falconry Regulations 9 (Jan. 1976) [hereinafter Envtl. Assessment - 1976].
Montezuma maintained fifty hunting birds in elaborate facilities. Id.
[Vol. 4
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/2
FALCONRY
North American falconry11 began in the 1920's and 30's when
a handful of Canadian and American biologists, conservation-
ists and sportsmen studied the ancient texts and began exper-
imenting with home-grown techniques for training predatory
birds. They developed a sport that is as much American as
the birds that they trained, and they achieved an intimacy
with their birds that is duplicated almost nowhere else in all
of man's interactions with nature. Aldo Leopold, the father of
the American conservation movement, distinguished falconry
as "all in all . . . the perfect hobby."12
B. Falconers and Raptor Conservation
In North America, falconers have historically been dedi-
cated to the salvation of birds of prey.13 Falconry adherents
worldwide have classically been at the forefront of raptor con-
servation. 4 Falconers have been the raptor resources' chief
11. Falconry was practiced occasionally in North America by European settlers
before the growth of the modern sport. Jan Baptist flew a Dutch peregrine (Falco
peregrinus) at quarry in the Hudson Valley in New York in the 1650's, and the first
peregrine eyrie in New England was discovered by a falconer in 1861. Id.
12. A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac With Other Essays on Conservation
from Round River 172 (1966).
13. The North American Falconer's Association (NAFA) stated the consensus
among American falconers in its general policy on protection of raptors. The policy
was published in a NAFA Technical Advisory Committee document which was pre-
pared for submission to the International Association of Game, Fish and Conserva-
tion Commissioners in 1971:
NAFA considers a key provision in any raptor management program to be
extension of protected status to all native raptors. While any native raptor is
unprotected, all are subject to indiscriminate killing by those actually or os-
tensibly unable to identify them .... No raptor should be allowed in posses-
sion for any purpose without issuance of an appropriate permit, in advance of
such possession.
See generally North Am. Falconers' Ass'n, Falconry and the Management of Birds of
Prey (Sept. 1971), prepared by the Technical Advisory Committee. See also Speech
by Roland C. Clement, Pres. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Last Call for Birds of Prey, Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y Ann. Meeting, Tucson, Ariz. (November 7, 1964).
14. For example, the fourteenth century princess and falconer, Eleanora of Sar-
dinia, introduced a law to protect nesting hawks and falcons. The mediterranean fal-
con, also known as "Eleanor's Falcon", was named for her. See M. de'Mannelli and G.
Maria, Le Constituzioni di Eleanora, Giudicessa d'Arborea Initolate Carta de Logu
103 (1805, reprinted 1974); see also D. Attenborough, The First Eden at 218.
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constituency and its most loyal adherents. 15 For thirty years
falconers fought and published against the state bounty sys-
tems and the annual "hawk shoots" which destroyed
thousands of raptors each autumn. '6 Their opponents were
state game agencies, song bird enthusiasts, 7 farmers, and
hunters. 18
During the early 1960's widespread use of the pesticide
DDT began to take its toll on wild populations of raptors and
other predators. Falconers were among the first to notice the
abrupt decline of East Coast peregrine and osprey populations
15. In 1973, Commissioner Henry Diamond of the New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation recommended passage of the bill allowing falconry in
New York, arguing that the enactment of this bill would aid in protecting wild popu-
lations of hawks and owls:
The decline in abundance among wild raptors is being accelerated by the
illegal shooting of these birds by uninformed people who consider them "ver-
min" in spite of their protected status. Dedicated falconers are the persons
most concerned over this illegal shooting and are in the best position to bring
to the public a better understanding of the need for protecting them.
N.Y. Senate, Memorandum in Support of Bill for the Protection of Wild Birds, from
Legislative Bill Jacket, S.B. 1813 (1973).
16. "During the 1920's and early 1930's, all birds of prey in every province and
state on the North American continent were officially classified as vermin." F. Beebe,
A Falconry Manual 83 (1984). Peregrine falcons remained unprotected or on the ver-
min list of every province and territory and every state save Massachusetts well into
the mid-1960's. F. Beebe, Hawks, Falcons and Falconry 283 (1976).
Fish and game services in several states formerly paid bounties to encourage
shooting or poletrapping of raptors. See Envtl. Assessment - 1976, supra note 10, at
2. Hawk shoots at migration points were an annual autumn sporting event. At Cape
May, New Jersey, 1,400 hawks were killed in a single day in 1920 and 1,008 sharp
shinned hawks were killed at the same site in autumn of 1935. Two thousand hawks
were killed at Blue Mountain, Pennsylvania in 1932. Over half of the first-year per-
egrines on the Texas coast were shot from 1924 to 1963. Id. at 14.
17. Envtl. Assessment - 1976, supra note 10, at 2.
18. In its April 1943 issue, Field and Stream, the nation's largest sporting maga-
zine, published an article by its editor, Ray P. Holland, entitled, "Look Out, Owl."
Holland urged all sportsmen to take up their guns, put up an owl decoy on hawk
flyway ridges and shoot all the hawks they could for game's sake. Holland, Look Out,
Owl!, Field and Stream 16,73 (Apr. 1943). In response to the article, Master Falconer
Alva G. Nye conducted and financed a national mass mailing campaign directed to-
ward falconers and sportsmen. His letter explained the importance of raptors to the
balance of nature and urged sportsmen and falconers to address protests to the pub-
lisher, Eltinge Warner. The response was so strong that Field and Stream has never
again published an anti-raptor article. Letter from Alva Nye to U.S. Game Commis-
sioners and Falconers (Apr. 7, 1943) on file at Pace Envtl. L. Rev. office.
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and to remark on the probable culprit as DDT contamina-
tion."9 In 1965, a group of falconers, conservationists and
scientists gathered from all over the world in Madison, Wis-
consin for the International Peregrine Conference.20 The con-
ference alerted the world to the disappearance of certain sub-
species of the peregrine falcon.2 ' The Madison Conference is
now regarded as the watershed of raptor protection. The pere-
grine quickly became the symbol of world-wide wildlife con-
servation.22 The Madison Conference precipitated national
legislation in North America and elsewhere which finally gave
raptors the protection that most falconers had long sought.
C. Raptor Propagation
Around the time of the Madison Conference the falconry
community began concerted efforts to learn how to breed
birds of prey in captivity to supplement declining wild popu-
lations. 3 Individual falconers began the first raptor propaga-
tion studies with private funds in 1964. By 1968 these studies
resulted in the first production of captive-bred peregrines and
prairie falcons in the United States. Between 1965 and 1972
falconers developed successful propagation techniques for at
19. Envtl. Assessment - 1976, supra note 10, at 2-3. See generally, F. Beebe,
Hawks, Falcons and Falconry (1976); R. Carson, Silent Spring (1962).
20. The participants were mostly falconers. F. Beebe, The Myth of the Vanishing
Peregrine 3 (not copyrighted) on file at Pace Envtl. L. Rev. office.
21. The peregrine is abundant in most of its range. Only one of seventeen sub-
species is regarded as endangered - the anatum peregrine. See Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of Interior, Draft Environmental Assessment: Falconry and Raptor Regu-
lations 6 (May 1987) [hereinafter Draft Envtl. Assessment - 1987]. Although popula-
tions of tundra or arctic peregrines have been recovered, the bird continues to be
listed as threatened because of its similarity in appearance to the anatum peregrine.
Id.
22. The peregrine was an effective symbol because of its nobility, and ironically,
because of its success as a species. The peregrine is the only bird that occurs on every
continent (except Antarctica) and on every major landmass in the world. F. Beebe,
Hawks, Falcons and Falconry 172 (1976).
23. Prior to the 1960's, when there was a rapid increase in interest in falconry
and a corresponding interest in raptor propagation, only one man is recorded to have
successfully bred a raptor in captivity: Renz Waller, in Germany in 1939, using pere-
grine falcons. F. Beebe, supra note 22, at 45.
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least eleven species of raptors.2" They devised methods to
maximize captive production through manipulation of photo-
period and clutches. As a result of these efforts, 947 per-
egrines were produced in the United States between 1973 and
1981. After 1973, DDT was withdrawn from the market and
raptor breeders began to stress the production of captive-bred
peregrine falcons as a source of stock to restore or bolster wild
populations. More than half of the peregrines produced in
captivity were released to the wild. Many more have been pro-
duced since the raptor exemption 25 was reauthorized in
1982.26
24. According to the Fish and Wildlife Service proposed rules:
[F]alconry and captive propagation of raptors are inexorably intermeshed.
Falconers and their associates have been solely responsible for the successful
development of captive breeding techniques and production of large falcons
and most other hunting species. This has been due primarily to their sus-
tained motivation and technical skills. Irrespective of whether this motiva-
tion was directed to the production of hunting stock for falconry or to the
restoration of wild populations, it has resulted in the development of man-
agement techniques and enhancement of wild populations for several high
interest species.
48 Fed. Reg. 1326 (1983).
25. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text; notes 159-67 and accompany-
ing text.
26. Raptors produced in captivity have reduced or replaced the demand for wild
birds. In 1976, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service predicted in its environmental assess-
ment of the proposed falconry regulations that 4,456 wild birds would be taken by
falconers in 1985. Envtl. Assessment - 1976, supra note 10, at 57. Principally due to
large supplies produced by raptor propagators, less than 731 birds were actually
taken. Draft Envtl. Assessment - 1987, supra note 21, at Table 2. According to Robert
Berry of the North American Raptor Breeders Association, Inc., (NARBA), a trade
association of raptor breeders:
[In] only 3 short years, the cost recovery concept has encouraged over 200
federally licensed propagators to commit millions of dollars into facilities,
equipment, expenses and time to maintain over 1200 hawks and falcons of 12
species in captivity for captive propagation. As the premier species in Ameri-
can falconry, the peregrine and the Harris' hawk have been the primary ben-
eficiaries with private breeding populations of 325 and 298 birds producing
80 and 132 progeny of each respective species in 1985 (latest official FWS
figures). NARBA's breeding population survey disclosed at least 136 per-
egrines produced in 1986, a 70% increase over 1985. NARBA predicts private
peregrine production between three hundred and four hundred birds by 1990.
Additionally, commercialism has spawned an unforseen benefit by encourag-
ing the maintenance of pure genetic strains of peregrines. Pure subspecies
demand significantly higher prices than do subspecific crosses. This is so
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/2
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Annual production of captive-bred peregrines is now
greater than the annual production in the wild, east of the
Mississippi, prior to the widespread use of DDT. Even those
raptor species which are not commonly used in the sport of
falconry have benefited from the growth of raptor propaga-
tion. The breeding techniques developed by falconers are be-
ing used in attempts to salvage endangered raptors from the
California Condor to the Mauritius Kestrels."
III. Protection of Raptors Under Federal Law and
Regulations
Legal recognition of falconry as a field sport occurred pri-
marily during the 1960's and early 1970's.18 The Fish & Wild-
life Service first permitted the taking of migratory game birds
by means of falconry in 1964.29 Raptors themselves were un-
protected by federal law until 1972.
Persons who take, possess, transport, import, export, buy,
sell, barter or use raptorial birds may be affected by one or
more of four federal laws:
1) The Migratory Bird Treaty Act,30 2) The Endangered
Species Act of 1973,31 3) The Lacey Act,32 and 4) The Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act.33 Of these laws, the two
that most affect falconers and raptor propagators are the Mi-
probably because pure strains' physical, biological, and behavioral qualities
are more predictable in falconry .... Reservoir gene pools of peregrines are
being developed and will be available in the event of another environmental
catastrophe like DDT.
North Am. Raptor Breeders Ass'n, Inc., 1986 President's Report 5 (1987).
27. Captive propagation of raptors is now a worldwide endeavor. "[A]t least 83
species or subspecies of diurnal raptors [are] now reproduced in captivity, some in the
hundreds of progeny and two (American Kestrel and Peregrine) in the thousands."
Cade, Propagating Diurnal Raptors in Captivity: A Review in International Zoologi-
cal Yearbook 5 (1986). F3 (3rd captive-bred generation) peregrines and gyrfalcons
and even F8 (8th captive-bred generation) kestrels are now reproducing in captivity.
Id.
28. Envtl. Assessment - 1976, supra note 10, at 10.
29. Id.
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-715s (1982).
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1982).
33. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668, 668d (1982).
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gratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act.
A. Raptor Protection Under The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
Section 703 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)
makes it unlawful, unless authorized under the regulations, to
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, possess, sell, barter or buy
any migratory bird listed in the treaty conventions which un-
derlie the Act.
The original Migratory Bird Act Convention signed by
the United States and Great Britain (for Canada) in 1916 did
not list raptors as a protected species. s4 In 1936, the Act was
amended to extend its provisions to a Migratory Bird Conven-
tion signed that year by Mexico and the United States. 5 By
an exchange of notes in 1972, the 1936 convention was
amended, adding the family Falconidae to the original list.36
By this amendment, American raptors received federal pro-
tection for the first time in 1972.
B. Regulations Governing Falconry and Raptor Propaga-
tion Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
Falconry and raptor propagation are regulated principally
under the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21, entitled
"Migratory Bird Permits." The original falconry regulations
under this section were designed by falconers and prohibited
the sale of all birds of prey for falconry 7 purposes. These reg-
34. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection
of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, 19 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
35. Pub. L. No. 74-728, 49 Stat. 1556 (1936).
36. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of
Extinction, and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990.
The American Gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus) is not protected by the treaty since its
range does not include Mexico.
37. Sale of wild hawks was anathema to the falconers who designed and sup-
ported the regulations. Many of these progenitors of North American falconry had
grown up during the final days of legal market hunting and strongly opposed the sale
of wild animals. American falconry has fostered a strong ethic against commerce in
wild-caught hawks. Trapping one's own bird is an American falconry tradition and is
regarded as an important component of the training process of the falconry appren-
tice. Today most falconers would oppose general commerce in captive-bred raptors
because it might mean the reappearance of caged birds of prey in pet stores. See
[Vol. 4
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ulations are listed in three sections: Section 21.29, Federal
Falconry Standards; Section 21.28, Falconry Permits, and
Section 21.30, Raptor Propagation Permits.
The "Falconry Standards" section establishes the mini-
mum state standards for federally approved state falconry
programs.38 The scheme was devised by falconers who partici-
pated in the development of the regulation." It is based on a
three-tiered system designed to protect the rarer, more fragile
and more difficult species from inexperienced falconers. Based
upon this system the regulation creates three classes of per-
mits: "apprentice," "general," and "master" and provides cri-
teria for the attainment of each.4
The "Falconry permits" section establishes permit re-
quirements, application procedures, issuance criteria and du-
ration of permits."
The "Raptor Propagation Permits" section was promul-
gated as a final rule in 1983 to allow the sale of captive-bred
raptors among licensed falconers and raptor propagators. 2
The "Federal Falconry Standards" section was amended at
the same time to allow falconers to buy and sell raptors. 3
generally F. Beebe & H. Webster, North American Falconry and Hunting Hawks
(1964).
38. 50 C.F.R. § 21.29 (1985).
39. The scheme was initially proposed in a 1971 paper by the NAFA Technical
Advisory Committee. See North Am. Falconers' Ass'n, Falconry and the Management
of Birds of Prey (Sept. 1971), prepared by the Technical Advisory Committee. The
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service adopted the proposal almost verbatim. 50 C.F.R. § 21.29
(1985).
40. Falconers wishing to qualify for a permit must submit references and pass an
exam testing their knowledge of biology, care, handling, literature, laws, regulations,
and other appropriate subject matter. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, New York State
Falconry Examination Manual (1987) (prepared by R. Kennedy, Jr. and C. Von
Shiligen). They must practice as an apprentice under the supervision of a master or
general falconer for at least two years before attempting to qualify for a general class
license. They must practice at the general level for five years and pass a field test
before qualifying for a master license which allows them to handle peregrines. Under
no condition may they possess more than three raptors at any one time. Their facili-
ties and equipment must meet rigorous requirements and be inspected by the state.
50 C.F.R. § 21.29 (1985).
41. Id. § 21.28.
42. Id. § 21.30.
43. Id. § 21.29. Applicants for propagation permits must be equally well qualified
as falconers.
1987]
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When the original falconry regulations were promulgated in
1972, raptor propagation was a rare and uncertain science,
and no provision for the sale of wild caught birds was needed
since most falconers opposed it. By 1978, raptor propagation
was common and reliable and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice sought to encourage propogation for its scientific value,
for use as a management technique for wild populations, and
for recreational use in falconry. The Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) discussed these purposes in a proposed rule:
The Service believes that raptor propagation has been
shown to benefit the migratory bird resource through pro-
duction of captive-bred stock for restoration of endan-
gered species, and as an ancillary source of raptors for fal-
conry that reduces the demand for taking certain wild
stocks. The Service wishes to encourage these activities
by ... permitting the sale of captive-bred raptors . . .
The FWS recognized the high monetary costs of raptor propa-
gation and sought to encourage the activity by allowing suc-
cessful breeders to recover their costs. 5 At the same time, the
FWS promulgated regulations to implement the "raptor ex-
emption" passed by Congress amending the Endangered Spe-
cies Act to allow the sale of captive-bred peregrines."
44. 48 Fed. Reg. 1327 (1983).
45. In the same proposed rule, the FWS discusses the high financial costs of rap-
tor propagation:
Raptor propagation often requires an extraordinary expenditure of time and
money. This is particularly true when propagating large falcons and eagles
that require special handling and facilities, and do not attain sexual maturity
until 3 or more years of age. Specially designed incubators, brooders and re-
lated equipment are required to maximize production. At The Peregrine
Fund, the cost of producing one peregrine to fledgling state had ranged from
$1,500 to $1,900 in recent years. The cost of producing other species has not
been assessed, but probably is about the same for eagles, somewhat less for
other large falcons, and considerably less for most other smaller raptors. The
cost of attempting to produce even small numbers of raptors can place a se-
vere economic burden on permittees with limited financial resources. The im-
pact is largely felt by the 150 or more private breeders who are attempting to
produce raptors for falconry.
Id.
46. 50 C.F.R. § 21.28(e)(2)(iii) (1985).
[Vol. 4
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C. Protection of Peregrines Under the Endangered Species
Act
Section 1538 of The Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA) provides that it is unlawful for any person to import,
export, take, possess, sell, deliver, or transport any species
listed as endangered pursuant to Section 1533 of the Act.47
Two subspecies of peregrine falcon were listed under The En-
dangered Species Law of 1966, which preceded the ESA: the
anatum peregrine (Falco peregrinus anatum) and the arctic
or tundra peregrine (Falco peregrinus tundrius). Both species
continue to be listed under Section 1533 of the Act.48 These
are the only listed raptors of interest to falconers. Peregrines
are both migratory birds (regulated by the MBTA) and en-
dangered species (regulated by the ESA). As such they are
listed species under both statutes. In such cases, the protec-
tion afforded by the Endangered Species Act and regulations
is in addition to, and not in lieu of, the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act and regulations. The more restrictive law or regulation is
applicable.
1. The Raptor Exemption Amendment To The Endan-
gered Species Act
In 1978 and again in 1982, Congress amended the Endan-
gered Species Act adding Section 949, the raptor exemption,
exempting captive-bred peregrines from the prohibition of the
Endangered Species Act in order to facilitate transfers of
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973).
48. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1985).
49.
As explained in a 1987 Draft Environmental Assessment: Congress amended
the Act to exempt raptors held in captivity (including their progeny) from
certain prohibitions of the Act.This amendment became known as the "rap-
tor exemption". The raptor exemption, in conjunction with the 1983 propaga-
tion regulations, allows for the sale of captive propagated peregrines. Con-
gress proposed to retain the raptor exemption when the Endangered Species
Act was up for reauthorization in 1985, despite considerable opposition, in-
cluding a proposed bill (H.R. 2767) drafted expressly to modify it by prohib-
iting the sale of captive propagated peregrines. To date, the Act has not been
reauthorized, and the Service continues to operate under the 1978 exemption.
Draft Envtl. Assessment-1987, supra note 21, at 5.
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these birds among qualified falconers and raptor
propagators."
The intent of the exemption was to promote private
breeding of peregrine falcons, "a costly venture."5
Congress intended that the raptor amendment facilitate
the exchange of captive-bred raptors through the elimina-
tion of certain ESA permit requirements that were criti-
cized before Congress by representatives of raptor breed-
ers. These representatives argued that restrictions on the
movement of raptors inhibited ready exchange among
breeders, thereby reducing their ability to breed raptors.
They also argued that certain ESA restrictions prevented
the exercise of falconry with endangered raptors, thus re-
ducing the incentive to breed them.2
2. Sale of Captive-Bred Peregrines Under the Raptor
Exemption Regulations
Regulations implementing the raptor exemption allow the
sale to qualified permittees of the properly banded captive-
bred progeny of peregrine falcons acquired prior to 1978.11
The statutory purpose of the Taptor exemption and its regula-
tions is to encourage captive breeding of endangered peregrine
falcons. The regulatory purpose behind the raptor propaga-
tion regulations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is to en-
50. The legislative history of the raptor amendment to the ESA indicates that its
purpose was to "alleviate some of the human pressures on wild raptor[s] ... increase
genetic diversity in captive populations, and ... further encourage captive production
of raptors for conservation, recreation, scientific and breeding purposes." H.R. Rep.
No. 1804, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
9491.
During congressional deliberations on the raptor exemption, an amendment was
offered in the House of Representatives to prohibit the sale of captive-bred per-
egrines. "[Ilt was rejected by Congress as "counterproductive" to the recovery of that
species. It was the intent of Congress to encourage private breeding of listed raptors
and to provide for the commercial trade of captive bred stocks for falconry." Fish &
Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Finding of No Significant Impact 6 (Sept.
1982).
51. 48 Fed. Reg. 1326 (1983).
52. Id.
53. 50 C.F.R. § 17.7 (1985).
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courage breeding of American raptors that are neither
threatened nor endangered. State laws which restrict the sale
of captive-bred raptors beyond the federal requirements ap-
pear to undermine the intent of the federal statutes and regu-
lations. These state rules raise serious questions about state
power to control privately owned captive-bred wildlife.
IV. State Ownership of Wildlife
Government regulation in America of the right to take
and possess wildlife is a legacy of the British legal system
which, in turn, descended from the Roman law. Roman law
considered wild animals to be ferae naturae, the property of
no one until captured.54 Evolution of state ownership of wild-
life began in England with the Norman conquest. The Nor-
man conquerors prohibited hunting by the general population
in order to keep weapons out of the hands of a potentially
rebellious underclass. Hunting became the diversion, and
game animals the exclusive possession, of the aristocracy."
British wildlife law at the time of American Independence
recognized the absolute power of the king and Parliament to
regulate the rights of individuals to take or possess wildlife.
Through the Royal Franchises and later the "Qualification
Laws" the king and Parliament assigned these rights to land-
holders and others qualified by rank and money to enjoy
them." Possession of game by a commoner was a violation of
English law.57
The European settlers of North America brought with
them a cultivated resentment against fish and game laws. Well
into the nineteenth century, hunters regarded attempts to
regulate their harvest as an odious intercession. Long Island
market hunters reacted typically to an 1838 statute" prohibit-
.54. D. Favre & M. Loring, Animal Law 38 n.9 (1983) (citing The Institutes of
Justinian).
55. See generally M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (1983); T.
Lund, American Wildlife Law (1980); Lund, British Wildlife Law Before the Ameri-
can Revolution: Lessons from the Past, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 49, 55-60 (1975).
56. Id. at 56-57.
57. Matthews, Who Owns Wildlife?, 14 Wildlife Soc. Bull. 459 (1986).
58. 1839 N.Y. Laws ch. 173.
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ing the use of batteries of weapons to harvest waterfowl:
[T]he gunners defied it; at first shooting with masks, at
the same time threatening to shoot the informer, should
one be found. They finally laid aside their masks, and the
law became a dead letter and has since been repealed."
After 1850, with newly created conservation groups and
hunter's associations encouraging them, the states began to
take more control over management of game and wildlife re-
sources. The progress of game legislation moved steadily from
east to west until by 1890 all forty-eight states had some game
protection statutes.
In 1852, the unpaid office of country moose warden was
created in Maine to prohibit aliens from hunting moose. In
1854, Alabama prohibited the capture of wild turkey by traps
and snares in certain counties.6 A Michigan law in 1865 pro-
hibited the use of punt or swivel guns in certain kinds of
hunting.6 1 "Fire" hunting of waterfowl was proscribed in some
North Carolina counties in 1869.62 An 1878 Pennsylvania law
prohibited the killing of wild pigeons on their nesting
grounds. 3 California prohibited hunting of elk and antelope
in 188364 and in 1890 Wyoming enacted a ten year closed sea-
son on buffalo. 5
The states also passed laws to regulate and protect non-
game species. In 1850, the first protection of non-game birds
was provided in Connecticut and New Jersey by the passage
of a law protecting "small and harmless" insectivorous birds
including the "small owl."66 The first law prohibiting the use
of ferrets or weasels in hunting rabbits was passed in Rhode
59. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Chronology and Index of the More Important
Events in American Game Protection 1776-1911, Biological Survey No. 41, 22 (1912)
(citation omitted).
60. Id. at 24.
61. Id. at 26.
62. Id. at 27.
63. Id. at 30.
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. at 33.
66. Id. at 23.
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Island in 1860.7 Virginia passed an "act to protect buzzards"
in 1879.68 New York and Pennsylvania enacted model laws for
protection of non-game birds in 18869 and 188970 respec-
tively. The New York law specifically exempted "hawk[s]"
from protection. The Pennsylvania statute protected all wild
birds with the exception of the English Sparrow. By 1890 the
first game commissions were well established; non-resident
hunting licenses were being sold in several states, and state
game laws were being published in pamphlet form.71
During this period, the courts consistently upheld the
power of the states to regulate game. A series of United States
Supreme Court cases in the nineteenth century recognized the
right of the states to control and regulate the "common prop-
erty" in game. In McCrady v. Virginia, the Court upheld the
power of the state of Virginia to prohibit citizens of other
states from planting oysters within the tide waters of that
state. 72 The Court, in Manchester v. Massachusetts, affirmed
the authority of the Commonwealth to regulate the catching
of fish within its bays.7 3 In Martin v. Waddell, the U.S. Su-
preme Court had previously identified these rights as a func-
tion of state ownership of wildlife within it's boundaries.74
The Court reasoned that people of the various states inherited
the powers possessed by the English crown including the own-
ership of wildlife. Since the state represents its people in their
united sovereignty, the reasoning went, ownership of wildlife
must reside in the state.75
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the state ownership doc-
trine in a landmark 1896 decision. In Geer v. Connecticut, the
Court upheld a Connecticut law which prohibited the trans-
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id. at 31.
69. 1886 N.Y. Laws ch. 427.
70. 1889 Pa. Laws Act No. 288.
71. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Chronology and Index of the More Important
Events in American Game Protection 1776-1911, Biological Survey No. 41, 10-11
(1912). See generally T. Matthiessen, Wildlife in America (1987).
72. 94 U.S. 391, 395-96 (1876).
73. 139 U.S. 240, 266 (1891).
74. 41 U.S. 367 (16 Pet.) (1842).
75. Id. at 410.
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portation outside of the state of certain game birds killed
within the state.7" The Court reasoned that the state could do
what it wanted with its own possessions. The decision cited a
"well considered" California Supreme Court opinion in sup-
port of its holding:
The wild game within a state belongs to the people in
their collective sovereign capacity. It is not the subject of
private ownership except in so far as the people may elect
to make it so; and they may, if they see fit, absolutely
prohibit the taking of it, or traffic and commerce in it, if
it is deemed necessary for the protection or preservation
of the public good."
The Geer decision established the doctrine of state ownership
of wildlife as the rationale for exclusive state jurisdiction of
wildlife management, and was settled law until the decision
was overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma in 1979.78
V. Federal Intervention and the Collapse of State
Ownership
Beginning in 1900 with the passage of the Lacey Act, 79 a
series of federal statutes and judicial decisions expanding fed-
eral power and protecting individual rights began eroding the
state monopoly on wildlife regulation and the primacy of the
state-ownership doctrine.
In Martin v. Waddell the Court qualified its statement
that the state retained all rights and powers inherited from
the British Crown by excepting those rights and powers which
the states voluntarily relinquished to the federal govern-
ment. 0 In the realm of wildlife regulation, the surrendered
76. 161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896).
77. Id. at 529 (citing Ex Parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476 (1894)).
78. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
79. The principal provision of the Lacey Act prohibits the interstate transporta-
tion of wild animals or birds "killed in violation of the laws of the State." The act
forbade the importation of English sparrows and starlings and protected the passen-
ger pigeon and other birds. Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187, 188 (1900) (current ver-
sion at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (1982)).
80. 41 U.S. 367, 410 (16 Pet.) (1842).
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powers are generally those which fall within the ambit of the
federal treaty clause,8' the property clause, 82 and the com-
merce clause. 3 Of these, the federal treaty clause is the pri-
mary source of constitutional authority for federal regulation
of raptorial birds.
A. Federal Authority to Regulate Wildlife Under the
Treaty Clause
The treaty clause empowers the federal government to
make laws necessary to implement treaties with other nations.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA) depends at
least partially on the treaty clause as a source of constitu-
tional authority. The treaty was originally signed to protect
birds that migrated between the United States and Canada.
By passing the MBTA, Congress gave effect to the treaty
granting the federal government authority to regulate those
birds.
Two years after the passage of the MBTA, the state of
Missouri tested the Act's constitutionality by attempting to
enjoin a federal wildlife officer from performing his duties
pursuant to regulations promulgated under the Act. In Mis-
souri v. Holland,84 the state, asserting title to all wild birds
within its borders, argued that the treaty and statute were in-
valid because they interfered with the state's sovereign right
to regulate wildlife. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes denigrated
the state ownership claim as a "slender reed. '85 He limited
judicial recognition of this doctrine to a grudging acknowl-
edgement that a state has the right to regulate the killing of
wild birds within its borders. However, the court ruled that
such rights are subservient to federal power when they come
into conflict with a valid treaty or an important national
interest.
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
82. Id. art. IV, § 3, c. 2.
83. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
84. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
85. Id. at 434.
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Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude
is involved. It can be protected only by national action in
concert with that of another power. The subject matter is
only transitory within the state, and has no permanent
habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute, there
soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We
see nothing in the Constitution that compels the govern-
ment to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the pro-
tectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is
not sufficient to rely upon the states. The reliance is vain
86
B. Federal Authority to Regulate Wildlife Under the Prop-
erty Clause
The property clause also provides a constitutional basis
for regulating wildlife in the various states. Under the prop-
erty clause, the national government has power to legislate to
protect its own property. Early case law established that the
United States had power to regulate wildlife on its own lands
notwithstanding contrary state statutes and game regulations.
In a 1928 decision, Hunt v. The United States,8 7 the Su-
preme Court found that the property clause gave Congress the
power to remove overbrowsing deer from the Kaibab National
Forest despite state law which prohibited the removal. Later
decisions interpreted the property clause even more broadly,
allowing federal regulation of activities that occur on state or
private land when such activities have an effect on federal
property. For example, in United States v. Brown8" the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the federal gov-
ernment had authority to prohibit duck hunting on state
property when such hunting would "significantly interfere
with the use" of adjacent federal park land. Recently, the Su-
preme Court in Kleppe v. New Mexico89 indicated that ani-
86. Id. at 435.
87. 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928).
88. 552 F.2d 817 (1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
89. 426 U.S. 529 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). In this case the New
Mexico Livestock Board, responding to a rancher's complaints, entered the rancher's
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mals that spent time on federal land became a "component"
of that property so that even when they wandered off onto
state or private land, they could still be subject to protection
asserted under federal statutes.9 0 Finally, in Palila v. Ha-
waii,"' the court suggested that in the case of an endangered
species with no connection to federal property, "the impor-
tance of preserving such a national resource may be of such
magnitude as to rise to the level of a federal property
interest."'92
C. Federal Authority to Regulate Wildlife Under the Com-
merce Clause
A third source of federal authority to regulate wildlife is
the commerce clause, which gives the federal government
power to regulate any item or conduct affecting the flow of
interstate commerce.93 Animals valued as pets or for their fur,
feathers, oil, hides or food potential fall within the traditional
meaning of the commerce clause since they provide commodi-
ties which enter the stream of commerce. Courts apply com-
merce clause analysis to cases involving birds which migrate
and fish which swim in navigable waters because of these ani-
mals' tendency to cross state lines.9 4
In Palila v. Hawaii, the district court held that the com-
merce clause was properly invoked in the case of a sedentary
species with no commercial value and no federal property con-
tacts. The court based commerce clause jurisdiction upon the
Palila bird's incidental connection with interstate commerce,
reasoning that students or professional scientists may cross
leased land to remove wild burros that had wandered onto the land from adjoining
federal lands. The Federal Bureau of Land Management refused to remove the bur-
ros. The removal by New Mexico state authorities was deemed contrary to the provi-
sions of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and was enjoined by the fed-
eral court. Id. at 546.
90. Id. at 531-32.
91. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (1981).
92. Id. at 995 n.40.
93. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3. For example, the Lacey Act, which was the first
major federal wildlife statute, was aimed solely at regulating interstate commerce in
wildlife.
94. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
1987]
21
370 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
state lines to come to Hawaii to visit or study the Palila. 5
As discussed above, the commerce clause authorizes Con-
gress to create rules governing the interstate flow of com-
merce. The Supreme Court has also interpreted the clause to
prohibit, as unconstitutional, any actions by the states which
interrupt the free flow of commodities across state lines. 6
This judicially developed doctrine is known as the negative or
dormant commerce clause. In its 1979 decision, Hughes v.
Oklahoma,97 the Court cited this constitutional prohibition to
expressly overrule its 1896 decision in Geer v. Connecticut,
which first established state ownership of wildlife as the law
of the land."8
The essential facts in Hughes were almost identical to
those in Geer. An Oklahoma law prohibited the commercial
export of minnows captured within the state. Hughes chal-
lenged the law under which he had been arrested for selling a
load of native minnows in Wichita. The Supreme Court ac-
cepted Hughes' argument that the minnow statute was uncon-
stitutional because it unreasonably interfered with interstate
commerce. The Hughes decision was the final nail in the cof-
fin of the state ownership doctrine. Terming the doctrine "a
19th-century legal fiction"99 the Court held that cases involv-
ing state regulation of wildlife should, in the future, be con-
sidered according to the same general rules applied to all
other exercises of the state's police power.1 "
VI. Private Ownership of Captive-Bred Raptors
In its wild state then, no one owns a migratory raptor. 11
Under the common law, ownership belongs to the one who
reduces the bird to possession. 102 Once a bird is reduced to
95. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 995.
96. See Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986).
97. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
98. Id. at 326.
99. Id. at 336.
100. Id.
101. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("Wild birds are not in the
possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership.")
102. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805), 2 Am. Dec. 264 (1805). This is the
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possession, the possessor has a property right until the animal
escapes, and even thereafter if the animal has the habit of pe-
riodic return, animus revertendi.103 Some courts hold that
ownership is retained in captive-bred, non-domestic animals
after escape even if there is no animus revertendi.1 0 4 By this
logic, the owner of a wild bird is its possessor. In the case of
captive-bred raptors, ownership resides in the licensee.
Ownership does not mean full and absolute control over a
thing. The courts often view ownership as a bundle of
rights. 10 Government has the authority to remove "strands"
from this bundle when it acts for the public good, so long as it
is acting within its enumerated powers and provides appropri-
ate safeguards for the constitutional rights of affected individ-
uals. Thus, the federal government may regulate private own-
ership in raptors through the commerce, treaty and property
powers and the state may regulate private ownership of rap-
tors through its police power. This authority, however, is sub-
ject to limitations which will be discussed infra.
seminal American case on the acquisition of private property rights in wild animals
(ferae naturae) under the common law. See also Shouse v. Moore, 11 F. Supp. 784
(E.D. Ky. 1935) ("Until actual capture has been effected, no property right is ac-
quired by any person in migratory birds that for the moment are within the borders
of a particular territory . . .").
103. Arnold, The Law of Possession Governing the Acquisition of Animals Ferae
Naturae, 55 Am. L. Rev. 393 (1921) cited in Fryer, Readings on Personal Property 55
(3d ed. 1938).
104. See United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 500 (10th Cir. 1978) (Logan, J.,
dissenting).
105. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). The generally recognized
rights of animal owners may be summarized as follows:
(1) The right to convey;
(2) The right to consume;
(3) The right to use as collateral;
(4) The right to obtain the natural dividends of the animal, and
(5) The right to exclude others.
D. Favre & M. Loring, Animal Law 48 (1983). Note that this list has already been
circumscribed by animal welfare laws which are recognized in almost every state.
Thus, one could conclude that the bundle of rights that an owner has in his animal
has already been reduced by the loss of the right to treat the animal cruelly.
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VII. Federal Authority to Regulate Commerce in Live
Captive-Bred Raptors
A. Application of the Endangered Species Act and the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act to Captive-Bred and "Pre-Act"
Birds
The principles discussed above make it clear that when
Congress wishes to act to protect or regulate wildlife, the
courts will allow the abrogation of state authority. The courts
have also granted Congress wide discretion to limit individual
rights in wildlife when those rights conflict with the national
goal of conservation." 6 This discretion reaches privately
owned (legally acquired) raptors, including birds acquired
prior to the implementation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
or the Endangered Species Act ("pre-act birds") and their
progeny, as well as the captive-bred progeny of other lawfully
held birds.
In United States v. Richards,10 7 a three judge panel for
the Tenth Circuit upheld Department of the Interior regula-
tions 08 which applied the regulatory prohibitions of the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) to the captive-bred progeny
of lawfully acquired raptors. Defendant Richards, a respected
college professor with high standing in his community, was ac-
cused of selling three sparrow hawks (American Kestrels), one
of the more common American raptors. Richards, the head of
the research animal laboratory at Brigham Young University,
had been breeding hawks since 1969. The ancestors of the kes-
trels he sold had been lawfully acquired by him at a time
when they were not covered by any national act or treaty.
Richards was sentenced to three concurrent terms (18
months) for violating the MBTA. 10 9 The pertinent provision
106. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15
(10th Cir. 1973); Lansden v. Hart, 180 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1950) cert. denied, 340 U.S.
824 (1950) reh'g denied, 340 U.S. 894 (1950).
107. 583 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1978).
108. See generally 50 C.F.R. §§ 10, 21 (1985).
109. The Circuit Court termed the sentence "appalling" in its severity but de-
clined to revoke it since it was within the statutory maximum. Richards, 583 F.2d at
497.
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of the regulations read as follows:
"Migratory birds" refers to all those species of birds de-
fined as migratory birds under § 10.1 of Part 10 of this
subchapter, and includes all birds of the species which,
whether raised in captivity or not, cannot be readily and
visibly distinguished by general size or coloration from
birds of the same species occurring in the wild state.1 '
Dr. Richard's defense was that defining migratory birds
to include those raised in captivity contravened congressional
intent. The defendant produced a legislative history of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act in support of this contention"' but
the court dispatched his defense with two arguments.
First, paraphrasing a 1921 federal decision in Georgia, the
Richards court advanced the proposition that "[t]he question
is whether the sparrow hawks which defendant sold belong to
a species or group that migrate, not whether the particular
birds migrate."'1 2
Secondly, the court stated that the wording of the regula-
110. 31 Fed. Reg. 11,231 (1966). Currently, "'Migratory Bird' means any bird,
whatever its origin and whether or not raised in captivity, which belongs to a species
listed in § 10.13." 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1985).
111. The legislative history cited by Richards and the dissenting judge tended to
demonstrate that Congress created the act to protect wild populations of migratory
species. Id. at 497-501.
112. Id. at 495 (citing United States v. Lumpkin, 276 F. 580, 583 (1921)). The
language of the Georgia case is compelling. The facts are not. The defendant,
Lumpkin, shot mourning doves which were incontrovertedly members of a migratory
species. Lumpkin argued that the particular birds he shot were sedentary, remaining
in Georgia all year. Since they did not migrate, Lumpkin argued, they were not
within the meaning of the Treaty. Lumpkin proposed to burden the government with
the impossible task of proving in each case that individual wild birds were themselves
migratory. The Georgia federal district court correctly held that all wild birds of a
migratory species were covered by the Act. The Montana tribunal in Richards cited
this language to bring captive-bred birds within the coverage of the Act. In the au-
thor's opinion, the better view is that captive-bred birds are not the targets of the Act
although they are within its coverage when necessary for enforcement purposes. This
interpretation is consistent with the regulation, which does not purport to include all
captive-bred migratory birds but only those which cannot be "readily and visibly dis-
tinguished" from wild birds of the same species. Under this regimen, Richards would
still have lost his appeal since unbanded captive-bred birds are impossible to distin-
guish from wild birds.
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tion was reasonable in view of the statutory purpose of pro-
tecting wild birds. Courts will sustain the validity of regula-
tions promulgated under a statute as long as the regulations
are reasonably related to the purposes of the statute. The
Richards court found the regulations reasonable because of
the difficulty in distinguishing birds raised in captivity from
others of the species. "From a practical standpoint," Judge
Breitenstein wrote for the majority, "the enforcement of the
Act would be difficult if the defense was available that a bird
involved was raised in captivity."11
These rationales were echoed in a Supreme Court case
decided a few months after Richards which upheld the appli-
cation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to the prior-acquired
artifacts of raptorial birds. In Andrus v. Allard,'14 the defend-
ants were American Indian artifact dealers charged with sell-
ing relics partly composed of feathers of currently protected
birds. The defendants challenged the validity of regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior under the
MBTA which prohibited the sale of raptors or their parts law-
fully acquired prior to the effective date of the act.1 5
The Court pointed out that the expansive language of the
statute applies to all birds and their parts including those ac-
quired prior to the Act." 6 It argued further that if Congress
113. Id. at 495.
114. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
115. The regulation provided in pertinent part: "Migratory birds, their parts,
nests, or eggs, lawfully acquired prior to the effective date of federal protection under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ... may be possessed or transported without a federal
permit, but may not be purchased, sold, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade,
or barter ...." 50 C.F.R. § 21.2(a) (1978).
The defendants also challenged a similar regulation promulgated under the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act:
Bald eagles, alive or dead, or their parts, nests, or eggs lawfully acquired
prior to June 8, 1940, and golden eagles, alive or dead or their parts, nests, or
eggs lawfully acquired prior to October 24, 1962, may be possessed or trans-
ported without a Federal permit, but may not be imported, exported, pur-
chased, sold, traded, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade, or
barter ....
50 C.F.R. § 22.2(a) (1978).
116. The statutory provision in question was the fundamental prohibition in Sec-
tion 703 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
[U]nless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter pro-
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had intended prior-acquired birds or artifacts to be exempt
from the act, it would have provided an exemption as it had
for migratory game birds on farms and preserves. 1 7 Moreover,
the court contended, if Congress had assumed that lawfully
taken birds could automatically be sold under the Act, "it
would have been unnecessary to specify in § 711 that it is per-
missible under certain circumstances to sell game birds law-
fully bred on farms and preserves."'" 8 The court viewed the
broad regulations favorably, reasoning that Congress intended
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act "to embrace the traditional
conservation technique of banning transactions in protected
birds, whenever taken."" 9
It is noteworthy that both the Circuit Court of Appeals in
Richards and the Supreme Court in Andrus gave overriding
credence to the regulation's underlying enforcement ratio-
nales. The leeway granted the Secretary's broad interpreta-
tions of the statute as covering both pre-act and captive-bred
birds was based on judicial sympathy with the enforcement
difficulties posed by commercialization of lawfully held birds.
In Richards, the court pointed to the impossibility of distin-
guishing wild sparrow hawks from the lawfully held birds bred
vided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful ... to pursue, hunt, take, cap-
ture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to
barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export,
import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transporta-
tion, transport or cause or be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or
receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird,
any part, nest, or eggs of any such bird, or any product, whether or not man-
ufactured which consists or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird, or
any part, nest, or egg thereof ....
16 U.S.C. § 703 (1982).
117. The court referred to 16 U.S.C. § 711 (1982) which says: "Nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to prevent the breeding of migratory game birds on
farms and preserves and the sale of birds so bred under proper regulation for the
purpose of increasing the food supply."
118. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 61. When applied to captive-bred raptors, this argu-
ment loses some of its force when one considers that raptor propagation would not
exist for more than half a century after Section 711 was drafted and approved. With
this in mind, the provision is equally probative at evincing congressional intent to
exempt propagation activities which promote the purpose of the Act.
119. Id. at 61.
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by the defendant. 120 In Andrus, the Court opined that: "It was
reasonable for Congress to conclude that the possibility of
commercial gain presents a special threat to the preservation
of the eagles because that prospect creates a powerful incen-
tive both to evade statutory prohibitions against taking birds
and to take a large volume of birds.' 12'
The Court reasoned that the legislative draftsmen might
have viewed evasion as a serious danger because of the impos-
sibility of determining the age of bird feathers. This rationale,
of course, would not apply to live pre-act birds or their prog-
eny lawfully possessed under the Endangered Species Act or
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, since the age of these birds can be
easily determined. The enforcement rationale which sup-
ported the Richards decision is irrelevant in view of modern
raptor identification techniques.122
B. Constitutional Challenges To Federal Regulations Under
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
All government conduct may be challenged when it inter-
feres with the constitutional rights of individuals. These rights
include the rights to due process and equal protection under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, as well as individual
rights under the privileges and immunities clause. The most
popular challenge to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act since it
was upheld on broad grounds in Missouri v. Holland 23 has
been the claim that particular applications of the act result in
an illegal "taking" of private property in violation of the fifth
amendment due process clause. The MBTA has been repeat-
edly upheld in the face of such arguments. 2 4
120. United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1978).
121. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 58.
122. Individual identification may be established by a number of methods, in-
cluding seamless bands, footprint xerox, and microchip injection. Parentage of prog-
eny may be proven by DNA testing. Used together these methods provide a foolproof
procedure for preventing commercial abuse of wild populations. So long as the falcon-
ers bear the cost of proving that a particular bird is captive-bred, these methods will
not burden the government's wildlife enforcement resources.
123. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
124. See, e.g., Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. de-
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Generally, when reviewing a statute in the face of a fifth
amendment challenge, the court will ask whether or not it is
fair for an individual to bear the burden of a regulation that
has a beneficial underlying public purpose. The stronger the
public interest the more supportive the judiciary will be of the
action. The greater the degree of interference with private
property or rights, the more apt the court is to find a taking.
In raptor cases, the statutory purpose is usually conservation
of wildlife and natural resources. Conservation is judicially
recognized as an enormous public benefit.
Short of outright confiscation, the federal government has
broad powers to regulate for the purpose of conservation with-
out offending the fifth amendment. In Andrus, the Supreme
Court overturned the District Court's holding that, as con-
strued to authorize the prohibition of commercial transactions
in pre-act avian artifacts, the Bald Eagle Protection Act and
MBTA violated the fifth amendment property rights of In-
dian relic dealers by depriving them of the opportunity to
earn a profit from legally possessed eagle parts. The Court
reasoned that government regulation, by definition, involves
the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this ad-
justment curtails some potential for the use or economic ex-
ploitation of private property. To require compensation in all
such circumstances would effectively compel the government
to regulate by purchase.125
In Andrus the Court balanced an important public pur-
pose against an interference that it regarded as limited in na-
ture. The Court acknowledged that the regulations would pre-
vent the most profitable use of the appellee's property, but
stated that fact alone did not create a taking. The Court
pointed out that the challenged regulations did not compel
surrender of the artifacts, that there was no physical invasion
or restraint upon them and that appellee may still derive eco-
nied, 341 U.S. 939 (1950) (denying recovery for crop damage caused by birds pro-
tected by the act); Landsen v. Hart, 168 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 858 (1948) (holding that the right to hunt is not a property right but a mere
grant of privilege); Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942) (holding that there
is no constitutional right to hunt on one's own property).
125. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (citations omitted).
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nomic benefit by exhibiting the artifacts:
[T]he denial of one traditional property right does not al-
ways amount to a taking. At least where an owner pos-
sesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction
of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. In this case, it is
crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and
transport their property, and to donate or devise the pro-
tected birds.,"
Under the commerce, treaty and property clauses, federal
power to regulate individual utilization of wildlife resources,
including captive-bred and pre-act raptors, is almost unlim-
ited in its scope and in its ability to withstand constitutional
challenges. On the other hand, state authority to regulate
wildlife under the police power has real limitations.
VIII. State Regulations of Wildlife Under the Police Power
A. Generally
Even with the demise of the state ownership doctrine, a
state still has the power to regulate wildlife within its bounda-
ries where that power has not been preempted by the federal
government. State regulation of wildlife is no longer based on
title to the wildlife but rather on the state's "police power."
"Police power" is a term of art used to describe a state's
power to pass laws which further the health, safety and wel-
fare of its citizens. If the subject matter of legislation or
agency interest advances one of these goals, then courts will
uphold the law and regulation as a legitimate exercise of po-
lice power. Courts have consistently found the conservation of
wildlife to be an appropriate subject matter for police power
regulation.1 27 For example, in Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v.
New York, a New York State successfully defended the most
126. Id. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
127. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1894); Aikens v. Conservation Dep't, 184 N.W.2d 222 (Mich. 1970).
128. 658 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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progressive and far-reaching piece of wild bird legislation in
America. The New York State Wild Bird Law and the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder prohibit the sale of any wild
bird in the state of New York unless the bird was born and
raised in captivity. 12 9 The District Court upheld the statute
against a challenge by pet industry representatives who ar-
gued that the purpose of the law was "the preservation of
world ecology" which they claimed is not a legitimate police
power concern. The Court upheld the defendant's argument
that:
New York has a legitimate interest in regulating its local
market conditions which lead, in a short causal chain, to
the unjustifiable and senseless suffering and death of
thousands of captured wild birds .... The state has an
interest in cleansing its markets of commerce which the
Legislature finds to be unethical. Moreover, a state may
constitutionally conserve wildlife elsewhere by refusing to
accept local complicity in its destruction. The states' au-
thority to establish local prohibitions with respect to out-
of-state wildlife has, since the late nineteenth century,
been recognized by the courts.30
The district court in Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v.
New York makes it clear that state authority to regulate wild-
life is still quite broad. However, under the police power the
states do not have the unlimited discretion to regulate wildlife
which they might have claimed under the doctrine of
ownership.
129. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-1728 (McKinney Supp. 1987). New York's
Sale of Wild Birds Law was adopted in August 1984. It states: "Except as permitted
by rule and regulation of [the department], no person shall sell live wild birds ...
unless such birds were born and raised in captivity." Id.
130. Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc, v. New York, 658 F.Supp. 1441, 1447
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). State laws regulating wildlife can be challenged when they interfere
with individual rights under the commerce clause or fifth and fourteenth amendment
rights of due process, equal protection, and the right to compensation for takings.
State sales banis have been attacked by plaintiffs claiming that the bans exceeded the
scope of state police power, obstructed federal treaty and foreign affairs powers or
discriminated against citizens in violation of the privileges and immunities clause.
See Matthews, Who Owns Wildlife?, 14 Wildlife Soc'y Bull. 459 (1986).
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For example, state bans on the sale of wildlife are subject
to constitutional limitations, 31 including those established
under the supremacy clause and the negative or dormant com-
merce clause. Under the supremacy clause,1 32 federal legisla-
tion on wildlife will preempt conflicting state law. Under the
negative commerce clause, a state law is invalid when it un-
reasonably burdens commerce.'"
B. Preemption of State Regulations Under the Supremacy
Clause
As discussed above, the state police power to regulate
wildlife is limited by the commerce clause. The supremacy
clause also limits state power when state laws conflict with
overlapping federal law. In such a case, the federal statute
may "preempt" an otherwise valid state law. "[W]hen Con-
gress legislates within the scope of its constitutionally granted
powers, that legislation may displace state law .. "134
The question of federal preemption is of interest to fal-
coners and raptor propagators in areas where federal statutes
governing the sale of captive-bred raptors are more permissive
than overlapping state legislation and regulations. The most
obvious examples are state rules which conflict with the "Rap-
tor Exemption" amendment to the Endangered Species Act
and the regulations promulgated pursuant to that amend-
ment. The Raptor Exemption and the regulations allow the
sale of certain captive-bred peregrine falcons."3 5 New York is
the only state which prohibits the sale of captive-bred raptors
by statute. 36 The statute prohibits the sale of all raptors used
131. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
132. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
133. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987)
("the principal objects of dormant commerce clause scrutiny are statutes that dis-
criminate against interstate commerce"); Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986) (ap-
proving Maine's total ban on import of live baitfish).
134. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369, 2372
(1986).
135. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text; see infra notes 159-67 and
accompanying text.
136. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-1009(1) (McKinney 1984).
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in falconry and specifies that "raptors for use in falconry shall
not be bought, sold or bartered, or offered for sale or bar-
ter."' Regulations have been promulgated under the act13a
which follow the statute in prohibiting the sale of all raptors
used in falconry. California 39 and Wyoming14 0 also have laws
or regulations which either severely restrict or totally prohibit
the sale of these birds. The question becomes - are these
state laws preempted by the federal Raptor Exemption?
Preemption is compelled whenever Congress explicitly so
provides by statute.1 4 ' Absent explicit language, the courts
must determine the intent of Congress when the legislation
was enacted. 1"2 The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part
test to determine whether federal legislation preempts state
law:
If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field,
any state law falling in that field is preempted. . . . If
Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over
the matter in question state law is preempted to the ex-
tent it actually conflicts with Federal law, that is when it
is impossible to comply with both state and Federal law
or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
137. Id.
138. 6 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §§ 173.3, 173.4 (1986).
139. The California Fish and Game Code governs transfer of raptors for propaga-
tion and falconry.
The commission may adopt regulations for the possession or training, and
the capture, importation, exportation, or intrastate transfer, of any bird in
the orders Falconiformes and Strigiformes (birds-of-prey) used in the prac-
tice of falconry and may authorize the issuance and provide for the revoca-
tion ... of licenses and permits to persons for the practice of falconry.
Cal. Fish & Game Code § 395(a) (West Supp. 1987). The regulations are found in Cal.
Admin. Code tit. 14, § 670 (1986).
140. Wyo. Stat. § 23-2-105 (1977) gives the Game & Fish Commission the power
to regulate falconry. Purchase, barter and sale of falcons for falconry and raptor prop-
agation are regulated under Chapter XXV of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commis-
sion Regulations. This regulation severely restricts the rights of falconers and propa-
gators to sell captive-bred birds. Among other restrictions each bird may only be sold
once in its life and only by the breeder. See supra note 8.
141. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
142. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369, 2372
(1986) (stating that "the first and fundamental inquiry .. .is whether Congress in-
tended to displace state law").
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plishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.148
Section 6(f) of the Endangered Species Act, while not ex-
plicitly prohibiting the state regulation of listed species, does
directly address the scope of federal preemption intended for
the Endangered Species Act. The section provides:
Any State law or regulation which applies with respect to
the importation or exportation of or interstate or foreign
commerce in, endangered species or threatened species is
void to the extent that it may effectively (1) permit what
is prohibited by this chapter or by any regulation which
implements this chapter, or (2) prohibit what is author-
ized pursuant to an exemption or permit provided for in
this chapter or in any regulation which implements this
chapter.""
Section 6(f) can only be interpreted as congressional intent
that federal permits and exemptions under the Act preempt
state laws which prohibit the sale of endangered species.
In addition to the clear language of the statute, the legis-
lative history of the Endangered Species Act unequivocally
shows that Congress intended federal law to preempt state
law pursuant to section 6(f) where federal permission related
to commerce in endangered species:
The question of preemption of state laws [regarding the
taking of listed species] was of great interest during the
hearings, due in part to the fact that the language in the
Administration bill was susceptible of alternative inter-
pretations. Accordingly, the Committee rewrote the lan-
guage of the Administration bill to make it clear that the
states would and should be free to adopt legislation or
143. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (citations omitted).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (1982). This section goes on to provide that state stat-
utes which restrict the sale or taking of native wildlife, and which conflict in part with
this subsection, are valid to the extent that they do not conflict with this subsection
(e.g., a New York State statute which restricts the sale of all peregrines and red-tails
would be valid to the extent that it restricted sales of wild-caught red-tails).
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regulations that might be more restrictive than that of
the Federal government and to enforce the legislation.
The only exception to this would be in cases where there
was a specific Federal permission for or a ban on impor-
tation, exportation or interstate commerce; in any such
case the State could not override the Federal action.
145
A series of federal cases have confirmed that by the language
of section 6(f), Congress meant to preempt the field and pro-
hibit state regulations which restrict interstate or intrastate
commerce in animals exempted under the Act.
In Fouke v. Brown,146 the Fouke Company, a leather hide
processor, brought a citizen's suit against the state of Califor-
nia challenging a California law which forbade the sale of
American alligator hides within the state. The American alli-
gator was a listed species under the Endangered Species Act.
Fouke had a valid Fish and Wildlife Service permit to sell the
hides under Section 1539 of the Act. The District Court found
the California law unconstitutional under the supremacy
clause and unenforceable as applied to American alligator
hides sold in accordance with the Act or its regulations.14 7 The
court enjoined state officials from enforcing the law.
H.J. Justin and Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian'48 and Man
Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian'4 9 both involved
state laws which prohibited commerce in African elephant
products. In both cases the Ninth Circuit found that state
laws were preempted to the extent that they applied to the
holder of a federal permit for trade in these products.
The Man Hing holding is notable because it dismissed
the significance of printed terms on the federal permit which
seemed to condition the permit upon consistent state law.
Condition 11(b), printed on the front of the federal permit
stated: "The validity of this permit is also conditioned upon
strict observance of all applicable foreign, state and other
145. H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8.
146. 463 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
147. Id. at 1145.
148. 702 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1983).
149. 702 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Federal law.' 150 This condition is part of the federal form
used for all fish and wildlife permits for trade in endangered
species, including permits issued under the Raptor
Exemption.
Based upon this language, the state argued that the per-
mit which authorized trade in elephant parts was void where
such trade was prohibited by state law. The Court of Appeals
held that the condition did not vitiate the preemptive effect of
the Endangered Species Act. To read this condition broadly
the Court said, "would open the way for states to impose reg-
ulation to supersede federal regulation of trade in imported
endangered species or their export or interstate commerce, a
form of state preemption clearly contrary to the intent of
Congress in passing the Endangered Species Act."' 51
C. Preemption of State Laws Restricting Trade in Pere-
grine Falcons
Section 1538 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 pro-
hibits certain conduct involving species listed as endangered
or threatened152 unless such conduct is exempted by Congress
or permitted by the Secretary of the Interior. 53 Among the
prohibitions are those which make it illegal to import or ex-
port, take, sell, or transport listed species in interstate or for-
eign commerce.154 Two of the raptors listed under the Endan-
gered Species Conservation Act of 1969 are of interest to
falconers and raptor propagators: the Arctic Peregrine fal-
con 155 and the American Peregrine falcon.' Both birds re-
main listed under the ESA. During the 1978 Congressional
session, strong evidence was brought before the relevant
150. Id. at 765. The court reasoned that the 11(b) condition was only meant to
insure that any trade under a federal permit met state or federal quarantine, cus-
toms, and agriculture laws. Id.
151. Id.
152. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1535(g)(2), 1539 (1982).
153. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A).
154. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B, D-F).
155. Falco peregrinus tundrius.
156. Falco peregrinus anatum.
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House and Senate committees 5 ' showing that the ESA's
prohibitions had impeded captive breeding of raptors by re-
sponsible falconers, conservationists, and biologists. 158 In or-
der to encourage raptor propagation, Congress amended Sec-
tion 1538 to allow the sale of captive-bred progeny of listed
raptors which were legally acquired before the effective date
of the ESA. This amendment became known as the Raptor
Exemption."'
Acting under the authority of this amendment and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Secretary of the Interior is-
sued detailed regulations' allowing qualified permittees to
sell the properly banded captive-bred progeny of pre-act per-
egrines to other qualified permittees.' 8 ' There is no require-
ment of state approval of such sale." 2 Yet several states con-
tinue to prohibit or restrict the sale of exempt peregrines and
157. U.S. Sen. Comm. on Environment & Public Works and the H.R. Comm. on
Merchant Marine & Fisheries.
158. Congress recognized raptor propagation by private and institutional breed-
ers in the falconry community as an important component in the effort to save the
peregrine and other endangered raptors. See Fed. Register, 48 Fed. Reg. 326 (1983).
159. The Raptor Exemption provides:
(A) . . . this section shall not apply to - (i) Any raptor legally held in captivity
or in controlled environment on November 10, 1978; or (ii) Any progeny of
any raptor described in clause (i); until such time as any such raptor or prog-
eny is intentionally returned to a wild state.
(B) Any person holding any raptor or progeny described in subparagraph (A)
must be able to demonstrate that the raptor or progeny does, in fact, qualify
under the provisions of this paragraph, and shall maintain and submit to the
Secretary, on request, such inventories, documentation, and records as the
Secretary may be regulation require as being reasonably appropriate to carry
out the purposes of this paragraph. Such requirements shall not unnecessa-
rily duplicate the requirements of other rules and regulations promulgated by
the Secretary.
16 U.S.C. § 1538(b)(2) (1982). See also supra note 49-53 and accompanying text.
160. Raptor Exemption, 50 C.F.R. § 17.7 (1985).
161. Id. § 21.28. Before the raptor exemption was passed, owners of breeding
peregrines could give birds to qualified falconers and propagators so long as no con-
sideration was exchanged. Under this "give-away" system there was little incentive
for a capable breeder to produce birds beyond his personal needs and the needs of
close friends. It was believed that the exemption would give these breeders an incen-
tive to maximize production and encourage new, qualified individuals to commit re-
sources to breeding projects.
162. State authorization of interstate sale of wild-caught raptors taken within
the state is required under 50 C.F.R. § 21.28(e)(2)(i) & (ii) (1985).
37
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
other species.
State laws which prohibit the sale of exempt captive-bred
peregrines should be distinguished from the New York "Wild
Bird Law" 1 3 which is regarded as the most progressive (in the
sense of protective) piece of wild animal legislation in the na-
tion. New York's law prohibits the sale of all wild caught birds
and the law was recently upheld by the Southern District of
New York in Cresenzi.le" The species of concern in Cresenzi
were unlisted under the Endangered Species Act and were not
the target of a federal program or affirmative federal regula-
tion under the Act. For these reasons the Court found that
the New York law was not preempted.
Congress has indicated that even state statutes which ap-
ply to interstate commerce will not be preempted by ESA
unless they conflict with affirmative Federal regula-
tion .... Therefore, the question to be resolved is
whether New York's statute is a law that prohibits what
is authorized pursuant to "an exemption or permit" pro-
vided for under ESA.16 5
The Cresenzis were commercial bird dealers who did not
possess permits or exemptions under the Endangered Species
Act. Accordingly, the Court properly dismissed their claim of
preemption. Congress clearly did not intend to usurp state
rights to protect unlisted wild birds from commercial exploita-
tion. However, contrast state laws which prohibit the sale of
captive-bred peregrines exempted by the Raptor Exemption
Amendment to the Endangered Species Act. These peregrines
are legally held, captive-bred, and privately owned birds. In
no case were they taken from the wild. Congress seeks
through the Raptor Exemption to encourage their owners to
enter them in expensive and otherwise resource consuming
breeding projects.
State restrictions on trade in exempted peregrines which
163. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-1728 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
164. Cresenzi Bird Imports, Inc. v. New York, 658 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
165. Id. at 1445.
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go beyond what is federally required frustrate the affirmative
Congressional goal to promote private propagation. These sale
bans, "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' 66 Congressional intent
to preempt state laws regulating commerce in endangered spe-
cies is clearly expressed in the language of § 6(f) and in the
legislative history of the statute. This congressional intent to
preempt has been upheld in three cases before the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 6 ' State laws which restrict the sale of
exempted peregrine falcons are in substance no different from
the California law restricting the sale of alligator hides which
was struck down in Fouke. Moreover, in the case of the Rap-
tor Exemption, state laws restricting the sale of captive-bred
peregrines frustrate the conservation goals of Congress. For
these reasons, such state laws are unlikely to survive a
supremacy clause challenge.
D. Invalidation of State Law Under the Negative or Dor-
mant Commerce Clause
Although the commerce clause speaks in terms of powers
bestowed upon Congress, the courts have long recognized that
it also limits the power of the states to erect barriers against
interstate commerce.6 8 State laws which prohibit the sale of
non-listed6 9 captive-bred raptors are probably incapable of
withstanding a commerce clause challenge. Federal regula-
tions adopted pursuant to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 170
allow licensed falconers and raptor propagators to sell prop-
erly banded captive-bred migratory raptors to other qualified
falconers or raptor propagators so long as these birds are not
listed as "threatened" or "endangered."' 7' No state approval
166. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
167. Man Hing Ivory & Imports , Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.
1983); H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1983); cert.
denied 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Fouke Co. v. Brown, 463 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
168. See Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2447-48 (1986).
169. That is, raptors which are not listed under the Endangered Species Act.
170. See Raptor Propagation Permits, 50 C.F.R. § 21.30(d)(5)(11) and Falconry
Permits, 50 C.F.R. § 21.28(e)(2)(iii) (1985).
171. 50 C.F.R. § 17 (1985). Lawfully held birds which were taken from the wild
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of such sales is required under the MBTA regulation.172
There is no statutory or regulatory provision which pur-
ports to empower the states to enact regulations (governing
the sale of raptors) which are more restrictive than the Fed-
eral MBTA regulations.173 Statutes and regulations in several
cannot be sold but can be transferred without consideration under certain limited
circumstances. Id. § 21.28(e)(2)(i), (ii) & 21.30(d)(5). The same "no sale" rules apply
to raptor semen and eggs. Captive-bred birds may only be sold if they are banded
with a numbered, tamperproof seamless marker, authorized by the Fish and Wildlife
Service. Id. § 21.30(d)(5)(c)(iii). If the marker comes off for any reason, the bird can
never be sold again. Under no circumstances may a bird be sold in the general mar-
ketplace. It may be sold only to limited numbers of qualified individuals designated
and approved by the states and the Fish and Wildlife Service. Id. § 21.30(d)(5)(c).
172. 50 C.F.R. § 21.29(b) (1985). Falconry Permit § 21.28(e)(2) enumerates the
rights of falconers to sell or transfer their birds as follows:
(2) Any permittee may -
(i) Transfer any raptor to another permittee if the transaction occurs entirely
within a State and no money or other consideration is involved;
(ii) Transfer any raptor to another permittee in an interstate transaction if
the prior written approval of all State agencies which issued the permits is
obtained and no money or other consideration is involved in the transaction;
or
(iii) Purchase, sell, or barter any lawfully possessed raptor which is bred in
captivity under authority of a raptor propagation permit issued under § 21.30
and banded with a numbered seamless marker issued or authorized by the
Service, subject to the following additional conditions ....
The conditions provide record keeping, and reporting requirements, and the min-
imum qualification of foreign and domestic transferees. Note: Only subsection (ii) of
§ 21.28(e)(2), governing interstate transfers of wild caught birds, requires state ap-
proval. In subsection (i) of § 21.28(e)(2), no transaction involving a captive-bred bird
requires state approval. Under the Raptor Propagation Permit § 21.30(d)(5), the
rights of propagators to sell or transfer birds, eggs and semen are enumerated as
follows:
Transfer, purchase, sale, or barter, of raptors, raptor eggs, or raptor semen.
(i) A permittee may transfer any lawfully possessed raptor, raptor egg, or
raptor semen to another permittee or transfer any raptor to a falconer who
holds a valid State falconry permit if no money or other consideration is
involved.
(ii) A permittee may transfer, purchase, sell, or barter any raptor which is
banded with a numbered seamless marker provided or authorized by the Ser-
vice, subject to the following conditions ....
The conditions set forth the qualifications of foreign and domestic buyers (gen-
eral falconry permit or its equivalent), the age and banding procedure of transferred
birds and detailed semen and egg regulations. Note that there is no requirement for
state authorization of sales involving captive-bred birds.
173. Paragraph (b) of Section 21.29 entitled, Federal Falconry Standards, con-
tains this provision concerning more restrictive state laws:
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states restrict the sale of non-listed captive-bred raptors be-
yond what is federally authorized. Some state restrictions in-
clude outright prohibitions on the sale of any raptors includ-
ing non-native and exotic species.' 74
These prohibitions must withstand commerce clause
analysis under the analytical framework established by the
Supreme Court: "In determining whether a State has over-
stepped its role in regulating interstate commerce, [the Su-
preme] Court has distinguished between state statutes that
burden interstate transactions only incidentally, and those
that affirmatively discriminate against such transactions.' 75
Statutes in the second group have been handled by the
Court in two ways. They are struck down without further in-
quiry 17 or they are subjected to the demanding scrutiny out-
lined by the Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma.'77 Once a state
law is shown to discriminate against interstate commerce "ei-
ther on its face or in practical effect ... the burden falls on
the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flow-
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a State from making
and enforcing laws or regulations not inconsistent with the standards con-
tained in any convention between the United States and any foreign country
for the protection of raptors or with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and
which shall give further protection to raptors.
Section 21.29 describes the least restrictive standards permissible for a state fal-
conry program to qualify for federal recognition. The three-tiered licensing scheme
envisioned by this subsection has been adopted in some form by most states. Para-
graph (b) does not refer to sale of raptors. Sale of raptors is not governed by Section
21.29 but rather by 21.28 and 21.30 which bracket it. There are no similar provisions
for more restrictive state laws under those sections. There is no indication in the
regulation or the statute that Congress or the Secretary of the Interior intended to
delegate to the States congressional power to restrict interstate commerce in these
birds. Regardless of federal intent, state power to regulate wildlife is derived from the
police power and must, therefore, meet the requirements of Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979) and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
174. See, e.g., N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-1009(1) (McKinney 1984):
"Prohibitions: (1) raptors for use in falconry shall not be bought, sold, bartered, or
offered for sale or barter .. " and N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 173.3(a)(j)
(1986): "no person shall buy, sell, barter or offer for sale or barter a raptor for use in
falconry."
175. Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2447-48 (1986).
176. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct.
2080, 2084 (1986).
177. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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ing from the statute and unavailability of non-discriminatory
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake."178
Statutes in the first group are subject to the less demand-
ing Pike v. Bruce Church test:17
9
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on inter-
state commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld un-
less the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question be-
comes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.80
The criteria for determining the validity of state statutes
under the tests in Hughes and Pike are similar. That is, both
tests examine (1) the legitimacy of the police power purpose,
and (2) the unavailability of less burdensome alternatives. 181
Even assuming the application of the more deferential Pike
test, 82 state prohibitions of federally authorized sales of cap-
178. Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
353 (1977)).
179. Maine, 106 S. Ct. at 2448.
180. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted).
181. The difference between the two tests as first articulated in Maine v. Taylor
seems to be in the shift of burden of proof from the plaintiff to the state once dis-
crimination is shown.
182. This is by no means a valid assumption. Captive-bred raptor sale bans can
arguably be classified as "affirmatively discriminatory." In its 1986 decision in Brown-
Forman Distillers, the Supreme Court recognized that "there is no clear line separat-
ing the category of state regulations that is virtually per se invalid under the Com-
merce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing ap-
proach. In either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute
on both local and interstate activity." Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986). The New York, Wyoming and Cali-
fornia raptor sales bans restrict interstate activity in the most direct manner possible.
By forbidding the sale of all captive-bred raptors within their boundaries, they
"overtly block the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State's borders." Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
[Vol. 4
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tive-bred raptors are still unlikely to survive.
The first question that must be asked to determine the
legitimacy of a state action under the PIKE analysis is whether
the state rule serves a legitimate local purpose. If no legiti-
mate local purpose is found, then the law will fail.18 3 State
legislation governing the sale of raptors or other birds is
prompted by one or both of two police power concerns."' The
first of these is conservation or wildlife management; the sec-
ond is animal welfare or the prevention of cruelty or mistreat-
ment of animals. For example, in Cresenzi, the federal court
for the Southern District of New York upheld the New York
Wild Bird Law based upon state interest both in wildlife man-
agement and animal welfare. The court found that the statute
was adopted by New York to halt commercial practices which
the legislators "believe might lead to the extinction or near
(1978)). The effect of these bans is the virtual closure of the New York and California
markets to falconers and propagators in the rest of the nation. The sale bans are
discriminatory because New Yorkers and Californians continue to be able to advertise
and sell their birds in every other state. In Maine v. Taylor, the Supreme Court
found that Maine's import ban on out-of-state minnows discriminated on its face
against interstate trade and subjected it to the strict requirements of Hughes v.
Oklahoma. In Hughes, the Supreme Court subjected Oklahoma's export ban on state
minnows to demanding scrutiny. The Court recognized that state barriers against in-
terstate trade, whether they forbid import or export of a commodity, represent "facial
discrimination: which by itself may be a fatal defect." In Hughes, the Court acknowl-
edged that the state's interest in conservation and protection of wild animals was a
legitimate purpose for the exercise of the state police power, but continues that "at a
minimum, such facial discrimination involves the strictest scrutiny of any purported
legitimate local purpose and of the absence of non-discriminatory alternatives." Id. at
337.
The New York and California sale bans forbid both import and export of raptors
for sale. It is unclear whether this scheme should receive more deference than a sales
ban which only operates in one direction. Under the state ownership doctrine recog-
nized in Geer (discussed above), states could implement sales bans of local wildlife
with impunity. The Supreme Court decision in Hughes v. Oklahoma referred to this
practice as being outside the analytical framework within which the Court would in
the future review wildlife cases. The decision characterized sale bans as "the most
extreme burdens" on commerce. "Overruling Geer also eliminates the anomaly cre-
ated by the decision distinguishing Geer, that statutes imposing the most extreme
burdens on interstate commerce (essentially total embargoes) were the most immune
from challenge." Id. at 335.
183. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
184. This article does not address agriculture, quarantine or other public health
legislation.
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extinction of many species" and because of legislative concern
"that many thousands of wild birds were dying as a result of
cruel and careless practices during capture and transport to
New York." 185 State interest in prohibiting the sale of banded
captive-bred raptors is less clear and is supported by neither a
conservation nor an animal welfare rationale. 18
1. Wildlife Management Rationale
From a wildlife management perspective the state cannot
credibly claim that the sale of captive-bred raptors under fed-
eral regulation causes a negative impact on the state environ-
ment since none of these birds are removed from the environ-
ment. All are in the private possession of individual
permittees. The state cannot claim to be protecting its inter-
ests in out-of-state wildlife for the same reasons. Moreover, all
available evidence indicates that raptor propagation and fal-
185. Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. New York, 658 F. Supp. 1441, 1443
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
186. Of the four states which ban or restrict the sale of captive-bred raptors,
New York alone has a statutory prohibition against the sale of all raptors. N.Y. Envtl.
Conserv. Law § 11-1009(1) (McKinney 1984). The applicable regulations merely track
the language of the statute. The putative purpose is conservation of wild stocks of
raptors. This provision was passed by the legislature in 1973, years before the wide-
spread use of raptor propagation techniques. The broad scope of the Act was reasona-
ble at the time because captive breeding was simply not contemplated as a substitute
for the annual harvest of wild stocks. The wording of the statute was adopted directly
from the recommendations made by the North American Falconer's Association. See
North Am. Falconers' Ass'n, Falconry and the Management of Birds of Prey, Appen-
dix I (Sept. 1971), prepared by the Technical Advisory Committee. Today the appli-
cation of the statute's prohibitions relating to captive-bred birds is probably excessive
in comparison to the putative local benefits. Those benefits would be promoted as
well with less impact by a prohibition restricted to wild raptors. Moreover, a prohibi-
tion limited to wild raptors would further, rather than frustrate, the purpose of the
legislation which is the promotion of wild stocks.
The putative purpose underlying the California regulation, as stated by the Cali-
fornia Fish and Game Commission, is conservation of "California's populations of na-
tive birds of prey" and other "raptors threatened with extinction." Resources Agency
of California, Department of Fish and Game, "Requirements for Obtaining a Fal-
conry License" 1 (March 1986).
The Wyoming and Colorado regulations are heavily oriented toward the conser-
vation and integrity of wild stocks of predatory birds. See Wyo. Game & Fish
Comm'n, Raptor Propagation Regulations, ch. 25.1 (1987); Colo. Div. of Wildlife, Re-
quirements for Possession of Raptors for Falconry, ch. 6, pt. I (1986).
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conry have either a neutral or beneficial impact on the health
of wild raptor populations. 8 ' The state cannot complain
about the development of a large interstate marketplace
which might be difficult to regulate since, under the federal
rules, only qualified permittees are eligible to purchase the
birds. 88 No raptor, for example, can ever be sold in a pet
store or on the open market. The numbers of qualified per-
mittees are never expected to be excessive. 189 Finally, there is
no enforcement rationale since available methods for identify-
ing each bird, its source and its parentage are foolproof.190
2. Animal Welfare Rationale
Neither can a credible case be made against falconers or
propagators from an animal welfare perspective. The self-in-
terest of falconers and breeders, as well as the federal and
state legal frameworks that govern these activities, combine to
insure that privately held raptors are the best cared for "wild"
animals in captivity. A falconer puts enormous resources into
a hunting bird. He or she spends hundreds of hours with each
of his or her birds. It takes three to eight weeks to train and
condition a working bird. A single damaged feather will cause
187. FONSI - 1982, supra note 45, at 7.
188. There are fewer than 100 falconers and raptor propagators in New York and
fewer than 2,500 nationwide. See Subcommittee Falconry Rules, Nongame Wildlife
Committee, Int'l Ass'n of Fish & Wildlife Agencies, 1986 Report 1 (1987).
189. Numbers of falconers nationwide have remained stable at 2,500 since 1976.
Id. at n.1.
190. Numbered seamless bands placed on birds within two weeks of hatching are
the principal enforcement tool. These bands are tamperproof. They are made of
heavy gauge anodized aluminum and are permanently affixed to a young bird's leg
when it is twelve days old to clearly distinguish it as captive-bred. The band cannot
be placed on adult birds because it will not fit over the bird's foot after it is a few
weeks old. The band system is supplemented by exhaustive paperwork and notifica-
tion requirements for each bird and egg produced or transferred under falconry and
raptor propagation permits. 50 C.F.R. § 21.30(10) (1985). The only loophole in this
system is the theoretical opportunity for an unscrupulous permittee to remove eggs or
young from a wild nest-site and claim them as the eggs of a permitted bird. There is
no evidence that such abuse has ever occurred. See Letter from C.R. Bavin, Chief,
Law Enforcement Division, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Service to
Robert B. Berry, President, North Am. Raptor Breeders' Ass'n, Inc. (Letter on file in
Pace Envtl. Law Rev. office). This abuse, should it ever be suspected, could be easily
detected by DNA analysis which establishes parentage.
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heartbreak to any falconer. Three broken feathers can frus-
trate a year of preparation and end the flying season. Each
falconer knows the exact weight of his or her bird, usually to
the fraction of an ounce, on any day from September to
March. Each bird's diet is strictly regulated as to vitamins,
minerals, fats, roughage, and amount and is calculated to keep
the bird in prime health and condition. Successful methods of
housing and transporting raptors without injury have been de-
veloped over two thousand years. Use of modern airline trans-
portation systems and refined shipping procedures have mini-
mized the risk of injury or death of birds in commercial
transit. Federal and state regulations provide minimum facil-
ity standards and equipment standards. In its 1988 "Falconry
Guide," the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation estimates that a falconer may have to spend be-
tween nine hundred fifty to two thousand two hundred dollars
to qualify facilities under the program. The competence of
candidates to own hawks is regulated by the state and con-
trolled by rigorous examinations (field and written) and the
federally approved apprenticeship system. Before a candidate
is deemed competent to own even a common species, he or she
may be tested as to his or her ability to recognize symptoms
and treat any of a dozen common diseases and injuries and
will be instructed on the intricacies of handling and day to
day care. As a result of this elevated level of care, life spans of
captive raptors in the hands of falconers are consistently and
significantly greater than the life spans of wild birds of the
same species. 191
These standards establish a threshold of care that simply
does not exist elsewhere. Indeed, were they to be applied to
wild or captive-bred animals across the board, these standards
would force the closure of the entire pet industry, every game
farm, hunt club, and the mallard meat industry, among
others. For these reasons, the animal welfare rationale ac-
cepted by the court to justify the Wild Bird Law upheld in
191. L. Brown & D. Amadon, Eagles, Hawks and Falcons of the World, 148-49
(1968). See also Kenward, Mortality and Fate of Trained Birds of Prey, 38 J. Wild-
life Management 751, 751-756 (1974).
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Cresenzi will not support a sale-ban on captive-bred raptors.
In the absence of wildlife management or animal welfare
goals, or even a far-fetched enforcement rationale, state regu-
lations which prohibit the federally permitted sale of captive-
bred raptors are unlikely to survive the judicial search for an
underlying purpose.
The second question that must be asked to complete the
commerce clause analysis articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church
is whether the local police power interest could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on legitimate interstate activities.
If the court finds a less discriminatory method of achieving
the rule's putative purpose, the rule will be struck down.192 In
Cresenzi, New York's Wild Bird Law was upheld because the
plaintiffs were unable to propose a less discriminatory means
by which the state could withdraw from the wild bird market.
By requiring that breeders maintain records and place leg
bands on birds sold in the state, New York has chosen a
rational and effective way of enforcing its ban on wild
bird sales. Plaintiffs do not suggest that any less restric-
tive alternatives exist, and it is hard to imagine a way in
which the state could prohibit such commerce without re-
quiring that birds sold in the state be identified as having
been raised in captivity. 193
In contrast, there are certainly less discriminatory means
of protecting wild populations of raptors than the across-the-
board sale bans in New York, Wyoming and California. The
obvious alternative is a sales prohibition like the one upheld
in Cresenzi or the one set forth under the Federal Falconry
Regulations; that is, a sale ban limited to unbanded or wild
birds. If, because of enforcement concerns, the state requires
greater insurance (beyond seamless bands) that wild stocks
are not being laundered through the legitimate market,194
192. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
193. Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. New York, 658 F. Supp. 1441, 1447-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
194. Despite occasional law enforcement paranoia on this subject, a three year
intensive investigation by the Fish and Wildlife Service was unable to discover a sin-
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there are several more layers of regulation available to protect
against this supposed evil before reaching the extreme solu-
tion of an absolute sale ban. One example is mandatory DNA
testing which is reliable, economic, safe, easily accessible and
which can be subsidized by the falconer. In Maine v. Taylor,
the Court noted that when acceptable testing procedures are
available for inspecting shipments of live baitfish for parasites
on commercial species, "Maine may no longer be able to jus-
tify its import ban."195 There exist safe, effective methods for
distinguishing captive-bred falcons from the progeny of wild
birds. Thus, there is no justification for a sweeping sale ban
because a less discriminatory alternative is readily available.
Far from choosing the least discriminating alternative,
New York, California, and Wyoming have chosen to "con-
serve" wild raptors in the way that most overtly discriminates
against interstate commerce: an absolute embargo on sale. In
terms used by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma,
these prohibitive regulations are certainly not a last ditch at-
tempt at conservation after nondiscriminatory alternatives
have proved unfeasible. "It is rather a choice of the most dis-
criminatory means even though nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives would seem likely to fulfill the State's purported legiti-
mate local purpose more effectively."1 96
State laws and regulations which prohibit federally au-
thorized sales of captive-bred raptors fail on both questions in
the Pike v. Bruce Church test. In view of that failure, such
state restrictions are in constitutional jeopardy as unreasona-
ble burdens on interstate commerce.
IX. Conclusion
State attempts to restrict the sale of captive-bred rapto-
rial birds beyond what is authorized under federal law are un-
gle case in which U.S. falconers were involved in laundering birds through the band-
ing system or in which U.S. falconers exported wild caught birds for sale to foreign
countries. See Draft Envtl. Assessment - 1987 supra n.21, at 1 for a discussion of
"Operation Falcon."
195. Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2455 (1986).
196. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 338 (1979).
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likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. The states cannot claim
ownership of captive-bred birds. These birds are generally
owned by the individuals who are licensed to possess them.
The states have powers to reasonably regulate wildlife under
the police power. However, state attempts to prohibit sales of
peregrines which are permitted under the Raptor Exemption
Amendment to the Endangered Species Act offend the
supremacy clause by regulating within federally preempted
boundaries. State laws and regulations which prohibit feder-
ally authorized sales of captive-bred raptors offend the com-
merce clause by restricting the flow of commodities across
state lines.
The unequivocal language of Section 6(f) of the Endan-
gered Species Act and the legislative history of the Act show
that Congress intended the federal law to preempt state law
when federal permission authorized commerce in endangered
species. A series of federal cases have confirmed that Congress
meant to preempt the field and prohibit state regulations
which restrict interstate or intrastate commerce in animals ex-
empted under the Act.
Even without explicit preemptive language in a federal
statute, a state statute will be overturned when it stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full congressional pur-
poses and objectives of the federal law or regulations. The
Raptor Exemption under the ESA (and the MBTA sale regu-
lations) were intended by Congress and the Secretary of the
Interior to foster activities that have significant scientific, eco-
logical, and recreational values. State attempts to restrict ac-
tivities sanctioned by the Act will not survive constitutional
muster, good intentions notwithstanding.
State actions which restrict interstate commerce will be
upheld only if the state can show that the action serves a le-
gitimate police power purpose and that no less discriminatory
means exists to achieve that purpose. The state regulations
discussed above fail the first test of reasonableness because
their purpose is obscure. It is difficult to imagine a scenario
1987]
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for which these prohibitions were designed.1 97 The regulations
fail the second test of reasonableness because they are not
precisely targeted. A total sale-ban is a blunt instrument caus-
ing impacts to non-target conservation, recreation, and scien-
tific activities that are easily and economically avoidable. For
the reasons stated above, state laws and regulations which re-
strict the federally authorized sale of captive-bred raptors are
extremely vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
Moreover, such laws are bad policy as a conservation and
social strategy. State laws which restrict the sale of captive-
bred raptors discourage raptor propagation by private and
public raptor owners. The benefits of raptor propagation in-
clude scientific and technological advances which abet captive
breeding of almost any avian predator. Furthermore,
thousands of young birds have been produced by propagators.
Many of these are members of endangered species whose wild
populations have benefited from this supplement. Captive-
bred raptors have been used to recolonize areas where wild
populations had disappeared.
Raptor propagation has become an integral component of
the sport of falconry and so it has an important recreational
potential. Falconry provides, and requires more recreational
man hours per wildlife unit than any other hunting sport.
Those Americans who choose to accept the discipline and
challenge of this sport experience a relationship with nature
that is almost spiritual. Invariably, they use these experiences
to educate others with a general understanding and respect
for raptorial birds. Public appreciation of these species is en-
hanced through falconers having contact with gunners, land-
owners, school children, and ornithologists. Raptors requiring
rehabilitation and persons encountering raptor depredation
problems benefit from falconry activities. 198 Individual falcon-
197. According to the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Service has identified no
"infractions of the new raptor propagation regulations." Also, "[firom the informa-
tion available . . . the new seamless marker appears to be working well .... Letter
from C.R. Bavin, Chief, Law Enforcement Division, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fish &
Wildlife Service to Robert B. Berry, President, North Am. Raptor Breeders' Ass'n,
Inc. (Letter on file in Pace Envtl. Law Rev. office).
198. For example, falconers are routinely called upon to remove eagles or hawks
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ers make important contributions to the collection of popula-
tion data' 99 and development of propagation techniques by as-
sisting wildlife agencies with the protection of indigenous
species, 200 and with the restoration of locally expired raptor
species. Large numbers of young falconers commit themselves
to careers in the associated sciences - biology, ornithology, and
veterinary medicine - seemingly as a direct result of their fal-
conry experience. Falconers have a vast knowledge of raptors
and have made significant contributions toward both science
and conservation. 20 1 They do so with rare inspiration, insight,
and dedication derived from the intense emotional and intel-
lectual experience of living at common purpose with birds of
prey. Because of the enormous social and scientific benefits to
be gained from the sport of falconry and the science of raptor
propagation, state regulations which inhibit these activities
are not only constitutionally impermissible, they are ill
advised.
involved in preying upon sheep or other domestic animals. These birds which would
otherwise be destroyed, are trained and bred by falconers. See Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Finding of No Significant Impact: Proposed Regulations to
Allow Golden Eagles (Aquila chrysaetos) Captured for Depredation Control to be
Used for Falconry (June 1982).
199. For example, it was an individual falconer, Morley Nelson, who developed
"eagle safe" power lines now used by power utilities throughout the American West.
200. See Fielding, J. Russell (Staff Assistant to Assistant Secretary for Fish and
Wildlife and Parks, Department of Interior), Keynote Address to NAFA Annual
Meeting, Yankton, SD, Nov. 28, 1970.
201. See Keynote Address by J. Russell Fielding (Staff Assistant to Assistant
Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, U.S. Dep't of Interior), to NAFA Annual
Meeting, Yankton, SD, Nov. 28, 1970.
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